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Sticking the Landing: Making the Most of the “Stakeholder 
Moment”
KENT GREENFIELD*
Abstract
This paper illustrates that the shareholder primacy model is still the prevailing 
model especially as the proponents of the stakeholder model have not come up with 
a theoretically sound alternative. It is argued that all corporations’ principal stake-
holders should be protected by the imposition of fiduciary duties on managerial 
decision makers. Homogeneity on corporate boards can reinforce thinking that 
leads to bad decision making. The findings of various researchers into behavioural 
economics are considered. It is pointed out that the interests of the shareholders are 
rarely, if ever, the same as those of other stakeholders. This supports the idea that 
a shift away from shareholder primacy is needed. The trade-offs that are often made 
in managerial decision making are represented graphically and discussed as an 
analytical tool supporting the central thesis that fiduciary duties with a broader 
range are the way to ensure that decisions take account of all relevant interests.
Introduction
One of the longstanding debates in the theory and practice of corporate governance 
is whether the corporation should be managed either with an eye toward the interests 
of shareholders primarily or instead on behalf of a broader set of stakeholders. This 
debate’s most famous iteration is the classic dialogue between Adolf Berle and E. 
Merrick Dodd, which famously asked ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’1 
But there have been other examples of this dialogue both before and since, usually 
coming in bursts brought about by economic or social shocks.2 For the past genera-
tion or so, shareholder primacy has been the dominant theory in the United States and 
in many other jurisdictions around the world  –  so dominant in fact that in the begin-
* Professor of Law and Dean’s Research Scholar, Boston College Law School. The author thanks 
Jean Du Plessis for his generous invitation to participate in the Inaugural ICGL Forum in November 
2013, and for participants in that Forum for their thoughtful comments and critiques. The author also 
thanks Hannah Marie Farhan for excellent research assistance. This paper was supported by the Dean’s 
Research Fund at Boston College Law School. (c) 2014 Kent Greenfield.
1 See Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931); E Merrick 
Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932).
2 Kent Greenfield, The Progressive Possibility of Corporate Law 28.3 Austl. J. Corporate Law 
3 (2013).
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ning of the twenty-first century two prominent corporate governance scholars pro-
claimed that we had seen the ‘end of history’ for corporate law.3
That was not true, of course. In fact, we have experienced over the past decade a 
significant pushback against the shareholder primacy norm, coming in legal and busi-
ness scholarship as well as in the popular press.4 Spurred in part by examples from 
Europe, where the legal and normative expectations of corporations were quite dif-
ferent even at the height of shareholder primacy, and by economic and political shocks 
that revealed the limits and indeed perverse effects of shareholder primacy, the skep-
ticism of shareholder primacy is as high as it has been in years.5
But accounts of the imminent death of the shareholder primacy norm are exagger-
ated. The theoretical arguments in favor of shareholder primacy continue to be force-
fully made, and can hardly be called frivolous.6 The best arguments in favor of 
shareholder primacy  –  that such a legal rule best constrains management from selfish 
and careless behavior, and that the monitoring costs of compliance with such a 
straightforward rule are less than those in alternative regimes  –  have coherence. 
Moreover, the underlying assumption of shareholder primacy that other stakeholders 
voluntarily engage with the corporation and can protect themselves through contract 
resonates with the libertarian mood inside and outside academia.7
Moreover, those academics advocating for the downfall of the shareholder primacy 
model, this author included, have had difficulty fully theorizing an alternative 
approach to corporate governance. Not only have we been inconsistent and even 
conflicting with the alternatives proposed, we have failed to answer some of the more 
obvious objections to alternative models.
This essay will attempt to improve on this situation by making three points.
First, this essay will suggest that the progressive response to shareholder primacy 
has been inhibited because of the tension between those who seek to emphasize 
‘shareholder activism’ to further progressive ends and those who want to defeat share-
holder primacy by a greater emphasis on managerial discretion and autonomy. I will 
argue that progressive corporate law scholars should instead choose a ‘third way,’ a 
set of articulated and enforced fiduciary duties that run to the firm’s principal stake-
holders. Shareholders will no longer be supreme, but managerial discretion will be 
constrained rather than loosened.
3 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law 89 Geo. L.J. 
439 (2000).
4 Kent Greenfield, The Third Way: Beyond Shareholder or Board Primacy 37 Seattle U. L. Rev. 
749 (2014).
5 Greenfield, The Progressive Possibility, supra n 2.
6 Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833 
(2005).
7 Kent Greenfield, Unconscionability and Consent in Corporate Law (A Comment on Cunningham) 
96 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 1177 (2011); Kent Greenfield, The End of Contractarianism? Behavioral Eco-
nomic and Law of Corporations in Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman (eds), The Oxford Handbook on 
Behavioral Economics and the Law (Oxford University Press, 2014); Kent Greenfield, Corporate Law 
and the Rhetoric of Choice, in Dana L Gold (ed.), Law and Economics: Toward Social Justice, Vol. 24 
of Research in Law and Economics (Emerald Group Publishing 2009).
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Second, this essay will suggest that the arguments often made in favor of share-
holder primacy on the grounds that it provides a clear rule for board decision-making 
are less persuasive than usually thought. In fact, there is reason to believe that adding 
more diverse perspectives to board decision making would create material benefits 
to the company. Here, I will argue that recent advances in behavioral economics 
indicate that the decision making of stakeholder boards would likely be superior to 
homogeneous boards representing shareholder interests only.
Finally, I want to address the suggestion, frequently put forward, that a shift away 
from shareholder primacy is unnecessary, since in the long term the interests of share-
holders and stakeholders coalesce.8 I have long found this claim to be unpersuasive, 
since there are many instances in which the interests of various stakeholders of the 
firm diverge even in the long term. Most stakeholders do benefit when the firm sur-
vives as a going concern, so there is correlation of interests in some circumstances. 
But in other instances, public policy or corporate governance rules fairly clearly ben-
efit one or more stakeholders more than others or at the expense of others. Here, my 
primary purpose is to propose a graphical way of portraying the tradeoffs inherent in 
a range of policy choices. I will not analyze such choices in depth; I will use them 
only to illustrate the new analytical tool I present.
I. The Third Way
For decades, corporate law has been dominated by a conceptual dichotomy between 
shareholder supremacists on the one hand and managerialists on the other. All too 
often, moments of ferment in the field have brought about merely a swing of the pen-
dulum from one of these paradigms toward the other.9
Shareholder supremacists lament the instances of managerial mismanagement and 
self-dealing and offer a remedy of increased shareholder power.10 If only manage-
ment were constrained, they argue, by additional shareholder power to nominate 
directors, approve executive pay, or receive financial disclosures, then management’s 
incentives would better align with shareholder interests. The downside of this remedy 
is that many of the risks of corporate power would increase with increased share-
holder say. Shareholder empowerment would hardly resolve the problems of short-
8 George W Dent, Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Direction Primacy Models 
of Corporate Governance 44 Hous. L. Rev. 1213 (2008).
9 While labeled differently, these two paradigms map fairly closely to the two schools of thought 
identified and analyzed by David Millon. David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 U. St. Thomas 
L.J. 1013 (2014). Millon labels the two schools ‘radical shareholder primacy’ and the manager-protec-
tive ‘traditional model.’ Both, as he points out, ultimately are aimed at shareholder benefit, though the 
former is more skeptical of managerial agency, and the latter is more permissive of it.
10 The leading voice of the shareholder supremacists is probably Lucian Bebchuck. See Bebchuk, 
supra n 6. He is not alone of course. For other examples see, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, 
Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521, 522 (2002); 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n 3; Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Gov-
ernance Reconsidered 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795 (1993).
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termism, environmental degradation, employee mistreatment and disempowerment, 
and risk externalization. In fact, the opposite would likely be true. This is because the 
interests of shareholders at best align with the interests of other stakeholders and of 
society as a whole only haphazardly, and at worst not at all.11
Meanwhile, the managerial and directorial apologists suggest that the way forward 
is to protect managerial prerogative.12 The goal is to empower the benevolent corpo-
rate elites to resist the short-sighted urges of the marketplace and manage the firm for 
the long-term benefit of its investors and perhaps even society as a whole. If only 
management would be loosened from the bothersome constraints of shareholder activ-
ism and government regulation, we would witness a burst of competitive energy that 
would carry us toward economic nirvana. The downside of this remedy is that mana-
gerial prerogative is, as a descriptive matter, overwhelmingly used to benefit manag-
ers. Explosions in executive compensation and perquisites, the manipulation of 
financial reporting and disclosure, and self-dealing in various guises are a more com-
mon outcome than benevolence. If the treatment for the ills of shareholder primacy 
is managerial empowerment, the cure may be worse than the disease.
There is a third way. Managerial obligation could be increased, without the obliga-
tion running solely to the holders of equity. Fiduciaries of companies could be subject 
to meaningful constraints and obligations, enforceable by courts, without disabling 
their ability to use the corporate form for economic gain. The conceptual innovation 
of this third way  –  I use ‘innovation’ though the idea is actually quite ancient  –  is 
for the fiduciary obligations of management to run to the firm as a whole, which would 
include an obligation to take into account the interests of all those who make material 
investments in the firm. Within this framework, it would continue to be a violation 
of fiduciary duties for management to self-deal, act carelessly, or exercise something 
less than good faith judgment. It would also be a violation of their duties to prioritize 
one stakeholder over others consistently and persistently, or to fail to consider the 
interests of all stakeholders in significant corporate decisions.
My argument is simply that we should consider a new kind of regulatory effort 
that builds a public interest element into corporate governance itself, creating the 
possibility that businesses become a more positive social force on their own. I am not 
urging that corporations become altruistic or charitable institutions. Indeed, the best 
way for corporations to serve the public interest is to create wealth, primarily by sell-
ing worthwhile goods and services for a profit.13 What I do suggest is that we should 
define wealth broadly, and require corporations to focus on creating it with both a 
11 See Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance 58 Case W. R. L. Rev. 1043, 1055–9 
(2008). 
12 The most prominent of these scholars is probably Stephen Bainbridge. See Stephen M Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547 (2003); see 
also Lawrence A Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back 
the Street? 73 Tul. L. Rev. 409 (1998); Jonathan R Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder 
Rights Bylaw 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 835, 835, 837 (1998).
13 I develop this point extensively in The Failure of Corporate Law. Kent Greenfield, The Failure 
of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities 125–42 (University of Chicago 
Press 2006). 
MAKING THE MOST OF THE “STAKEHOLDER MOMENT” [2015] EBLR 151
greater awareness of the costs inherent in its creation and the benefits that flow from 
broadly distributing it.
Often, the battle within corporate law has been between managerialists on the one 
hand and shareholder supremacists on the other. Efforts to protect the other stakehold-
ers of the corporation have been left to the ‘external’ regulation of antitrust law, 
environmental law, labor law, and the like. But these efforts have mostly been of the 
‘command-and-control’ type, working like a fleet of tugboats to pull the corporate 
tanker ship away from what would otherwise be their natural course.14 If we can cre-
ate the initiative within large corporations to head in the correct direction on their 
own, we will need fewer tugboats to correct their course later.
To move forward with this grand project, the most crucial reform is conceptual 
rather than legal or political. We should cease thinking of corporations as property 
owned by shareholders, whose ownership in any event is recognized only in the 
breach. Instead, we should conceptualize businesses as team-like collective economic 
enterprises making use of a multitude of inputs from various kinds of investors. As I 
have said elsewhere, ‘Corporations are collective enterprises, drawing on investments 
from various stakeholders who contribute to the firm’s success.’15 The success of 
corporations depends on the contributions of many different stakeholders, and the 
governance of corporations should recognize those contributions. Fixating on the 
contributions of only one of these groups – shareholders – blinds us to the essential 
investments of the others, and encourages management to prioritize shareholder inter-
est alone. But for a business to succeed people and institutions must invest financial 
capital; other people must invest labor, intelligence, skill, and attention; local com-
munities must invest infrastructure of various kinds.
None of these investors makes its contribution out of altruism or obligation. What 
they are doing is contributing in hopes of potential gain if things go well. They expect 
management to gather inputs from other contributors, put them together in a way that 
will enable the company to produce goods or services for a profit, and then distribute 
the wealth that is created. The benefits can come in various forms – goods and services 
for consumers, jobs for employees, tax bases for communities, financial returns for 
investors. Each of the contributors has a stake in the company, and the company 
depends on the contributions of each stakeholder. Unfortunately, in our current regu-
latory scheme in the United States, the concerns of the other stakeholders are not 
considered within the internal, structural machinery of corporate governance. These 
stakeholders are to be taken care of, to the extent they are at all, by way of protections 
they can gain through contract or external regulation.
Compare this to the UK model of corporate governance, which at least recognizes 
the obligations to consider these interests, and the European model, which requires 
14 See Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law 57 Emory L. J. 948, 
970–74 (2008).
15 Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, supra n 11, 1043. The classic description of the 
‘team’ theory of the firm, some of which I accept and some of which I do not, is by Blair and Stout. 
Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 
318–22 (1999).
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much more robust social obligation on the part of corporations embodied both in 
cultural norms and law.16 Under the European model, the duty to disclose informa-
tion and consult with employees is much more robust, and many large European 
companies include labor representatives on their boards. These efforts to include 
employees in company governance are intended to embody norms of workplace 
democracy and economic fairness. But they are also seen as an important component 
of economic success, and indeed Germany  –  where co-determination is strongest 
–  is now the economic powerhouse of Europe. The CEO of the German company 
Siemens argues that codetermination is a ‘comparative advantage’ for Germany;17 
the senior managing director of the U.S. investment firm Blackstone Group has said 
board-level employee representation was one of the factors that allowed Germany to 
avoid the worst of the financial crisis.18
Once we escape the conceptual stranglehold of shareholder-as-owner, then we can 
ask the kind of robust questions that go to the heart of the matter. Most crucially: How 
can we create, empower, and regulate business entities so that they are most likely to 
create wealth, broadly defined and distributed, while minimizing their harms both 
immediate and latent? There are a wide range of possible answers to this question, 
but allow me to propose a few specific regulatory changes for corporate law and gov-
ernance that would fit within this framework.
First, the law of corporate governance should expand the fiduciary duties of man-
agement to include an obligation to consider the interests of all stakeholders in the 
firm. For decades, the fiduciary obligations of management have been categorized as 
including a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. Under current judicial interpretation in 
the United States, both mean something less than one might assume  –  ‘care’ has 
essentially become the duty to gather information and avoid gross negligence; ‘loy-
alty’ has devolved into a mere ban on undisclosed self-dealing, such as managers 
doing special deals with the company on the side.
While it would not hurt if both of these duties were more robust with regard to 
shareholders, what I am suggesting here is that they run to all the stakeholders of the 
company, not just shareholders. With regard to the duty of care, this would mean that 
when senior management or the board makes decisions on the strategic course of the 
company, they would need to gather and consider information on the effects of the 
decision on the company’s stakeholders. They would not be able to meet their obliga-
tion simply by evaluating the impact of the decision on the company balance sheet 
but by assessing the long-term impact of the decision on the company as a whole, 
including its implications for employees, consumers, and other stakeholders. As to 
the duty of loyalty, little would change except to whom the duty would run, meaning 
16 Aline Conchon, Board Level Employee Representation Rights in Europe: Facts and Trends, http://
www.etui.org/Publications2/Reports/Board-level-employee-representation-rights-in-Europe (2011); see 
also worker-participation.eu, MAP: Board-Level Representation in the European Economic Area, http://
www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Board-level-Representa-
tion2/MAP-Board-level-representation-in-the-European-Economic-Area2 (27 Sept. 2013).
17 Conchon, supra n 16. 
18 Ibid., 8.
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there would be a greater number of people interested in monitoring the possible mal-
feasance of management. And, by the way, if a broader duty also meant that the duties 
were more seriously enforced, the shareholders, too, would be happier.
Admittedly, this change would be more in terms of process than in required results. 
But process matters, especially when we are talking about the choices of some of the 
most powerful group decision makers in the world. At the very least, corporate direc-
tors (and the executives who putatively report to them) would not be able to make 
decisions in which the only metric that matters is stock price, measured day-to-day 
or even quarter-by-quarter.
Besides, this broader fiduciary duty would benefit the company over time. Fidu-
ciary obligations build trust in those who contribute, since they know management 
has a duty to look after their interests. If management owes obligations of care and 
loyalty to all the firm’s important stakeholders, they are both more likely to invest in 
the first place and more likely to leave their investment in place over time. This has 
long been thought to be true of shareholders; but it is true for other kinds of ‘inves-
tors’ as well. For example, employees who do not fear that their interests will be 
shoved aside any time they are in conflict with short-term profitability will be more 
loyal and will be more willing to develop firm-specific skills that benefit the company 
over time, and they will take less of an us-versus-them attitude toward management.19
The second specific regulatory change I propose would be to change the actual 
structure of company boards to allow for the nomination and election of board mem-
bers who embody or can credibly speak for the interests of stakeholders.20 Currently, 
the boards of US companies embody the interests of two groups: senior management 
and large shareholders. Once we recognize that a variety of stakeholders make essen-
tial contributions to the firm, we must face the reality that the current structure does 
not serve most of those stakeholders well. The way to change this is to require boards 
to reflect a broader cross section of those who contribute to their companies’ success.
How to do this? Figuring out which stakeholders deserve representation and how 
much they deserve would undoubtedly be tricky. But it need not be impossible. 
Employee representatives would be fairly straightforward to elect; either we could 
use the German model, in which employee representatives are selected by the com-
pany workforce, or we could simply issue each employee one share of a special class 
of stock and have a number of board seats elected by that class. If we wanted other 
stakeholders represented, there are various ways it could be done. Community leaders 
in the localities where the company has a major presence could nominate a director; 
long-term business partners and creditors could be represented as well. We could even 
draw on the Dutch experience and require companies to include a ‘public interest 
19 Evidence from Europe bears this out – countries that have strong worker involvement in cor-
porate governance enjoy higher rates of worker productivity, and fewer days lost to strikes, than in 
countries without such involvement. Stuart Vitols, Prospects for Trade Unions in the Evolving Euro-
pean System of Corporate Governance, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/gurn/00299.pdf, Table 5 (2005).
20 See Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, supra n 11.
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director,’ whose special obligation would be to vet company decisions from the stand-
point of the public.21
Clearly, more work needs to be done here, both to develop the theory and the prac-
tical prescriptions to test and implement it. But rather than careening between the 
poles of shareholder primacy or managerial prerogative, this third way of robust fidu-
ciary duties to the company as a whole – which broadens the duty beyond sharehold-
ers and creates mechanisms to make such duty more than merely precatory – offers 
a viable alternative around which stakeholder theorists can coalesce.
II. Diversity and Corporate Decision Making
One of the paradigmatic arguments in favor of shareholder primacy is that it provides 
a clear rule for board and managerial decision-making. The clarity of the rule means 
both that managers will not be in doubt as to the ultimate objective in their decision-
making and that it will be easier to monitor whether they satisfy it. If the duties of the 
board are expanded, the argument goes, corporate managers will have more than one 
‘master’ and could then avoid real responsibility to any stakeholder by claiming their 
actions are to further the interests of another. Economists call this an “agency costs” 
argument: enlarging the duties of management will increase the agency costs inherent 
in managing the firm, since it will be more difficult to monitor whether the managers 
are in fact doing their jobs carefully and in good faith.
There are a number of answers to this argument, many of which I have set out 
elsewhere.22 One additional argument deserves to be made now, based on recent 
insights offered by behavioral research into group decision-making. At base, the argu-
ment against stakeholder involvement in corporate decision-making is that the inclu-
sion of their interests will weaken the quality of such decision-making. But there are 
increasing indications that decision-making would instead be improved with the inclu-
sion of stakeholder representatives and interests.
Behavioral economics began to be taken seriously in the legal academy in the last 
decade of the twentieth century,23 and by the early 2000s was beginning to gain trac-
tion in corporate law scholarship.24 Behavioral economics presented a profound chal-
21 Waheed Hussain, The Law Should Make Boards More Diverse, NY Times, http://www.nytimes.
com/roomfordebate/2012/07/04/who-are-corporate-directors-working-for-anyway/the-law-should-make-
boards-more-diverse (4 July 2012).
22 Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age 2 Harv. L. & Pol’y. Rev. 
501, 529–31 (2008).
23 Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Econom-
ics 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); Donald Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision 
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499 (1998); Russell B Korobkin 
& Thomas S Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051 (2000).
24 Donald Langevoort, Behavioral Law and Economics in Cass R Sunstein (ed.), Organized Illu-
sions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other 
Social Harms) (Cambridge University Press 2000); Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, Trust, Trust-
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lenge to corporate law, since it revealed the depth of and ubiquity of cognitive errors 
that weaken the ability of corporate law to rely on ‘the Coasean prediction’ that the 
law can and should presumptively rely on the decisions of private parties ‘to allocate 
rights and obligations optimally.’25 Among the implications of behavioral economics 
for corporate and securities law are an increased skepticism of the notion of an effi-
cient capital market, and a deceased reliance on disclosure as a cure-all.26 Potentially, 
the most profound implications of behavioral research for corporate governance 
relates to the question of whether the structure and makeup of corporate boards sup-
press or inflate irrationalities.
The structure and makeup of boards are quite important for two reasons. First, the 
fact that the corporation has a sophisticated group decision-maker at the top of the 
structural hierarchy is seen as a distinctive element of the success of the corporation 
as a business form.27 The board functions as a group decision maker for the most 
important questions that the company faces, and in the words of Stephen Bainbridge, 
‘it seems useful to think of the board as a production team’ with decisions being the 
product produced.28 When working properly, boards offer material benefits as com-
pared to solitary, individual decision-makers typical in sole proprietorships or to small 
groups of decision makers typical in partnerships or similar enterprises. The benefits 
of group decision making can be significant and in many cases so outpace individual 
decision-making that the success of groups is higher not only than the average indi-
vidual in the group but even higher than the best individual in the group.29 In complex 
organizations such as corporations, the benefits of group decision-making may be 
even more profound, since ‘the effective oversight of an organization exceeds the 
capabilities of any individual’ and ‘collective knowledge and deliberation are better 
suited to this task.’30
Second, the form and process of the board is a central issue in corporate law 
because it is the primary focus of judicial oversight. Courts are typically reluctant to 
second-guess the substantive business judgment of management, so courts instead 
evaluate the propriety of challenged managerial judgments on the basis of the process 
followed by the board, the information available to it, and its disinterestedness. 
‘[S]o long as a sufficiently independent decision-maker within the approved corporate 
worthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1753 (2001); Kent 
Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as a 
Regulatory Tool 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 581 (2002).
25 J Jennifer Arlen, Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Rela-
tionships 31 J. Legal Stud. 1, 2 (2002).
26 Greenfield, Handbook, supra n 7.
27 Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Harvard 
University Press, 1977); Stephen Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decision Making in Corporate 
Governance 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2002); Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law, supra n 24.
28 Bainbridge, Why a Board?, supra n 27, 8.
29 Ibid.
30 Daniel Forbes & Frances Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards 
of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups 24 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 489, 490 (1999).
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hierarchy has been given all the material facts and approved some action after due 
deliberation, the action is beyond serious judicial review.’31
Traditionally, the disinterestedness obligation of board members was deemed to 
be violated only when decision-makers had some kind of pecuniary interest at stake, 
or had a close family member so interested. The worry, of course, was that corporate 
leaders were acting on the basis of self-interest rather than for the benefit of the cor-
poration. Courts and commentators, therefore, often concentrated on the ‘indepen-
dence’ of members of the board, as defined by the lack of employment or financial 
relationship with the company. Decisions made by a board dominated by non-inde-
pendent members were seen as tainted; decisions validated by independent members 
were deemed trustworthy.32 The academic literature generally looked at function 
more than form, but even there the key question was whether board members were 
sufficiently independent in perspective and attitude to satisfy the board’s monitoring 
obligation.33
Especially in the light of the judicial focus on structure and process and on eco-
nomic ties as sources of disloyalty, behavioral research revealing predictable flaws 
in group decision  making is likely to pose difficulties for traditional corporate law 
doctrine. For example, behavioral studies have shown significant skewing effects on 
decision-making springing from sources other than economic interests. One such 
effect is that of in-group/out-group identification. When those inside a group (board 
members, for example) are challenged by someone outside the group (a shareholder 
plaintiff alleging a breach of fiduciary duty, for example) they tend to defend and 
defer to their fellow group members.34 So even if a group member is independent in 
that she has no financial interest in the conflict, the psychological tendency to align 
against the challenger will influence her review of the merits of the challenge. More 
generally, any psychological effect that makes it difficult for a director truly to provide 
an independent check on management is largely ignored by corporate doctrine, even 
when decision-making is biased significantly.35
In addition, behavioral research has shown predictable defects in decision making 
that have less to do with self-interest or disloyalty than with other kinds of bias and 
mistake. As mentioned above, group decision-making is thought to be a significant 
reason for the success of corporations as a business form, in part because of a group’s 
31 Daniel Langevoort, Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law in CA Hill et al. (eds), Research 
Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law, 446 (Edward Elgar 2012).
32 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 
906 A.2d 27 (2006).
33 Victor Brudne y, The Independent Director: Heavenly City or Potemkin Village? 95 Harv. L. 
Rev. 597 (1982); Daniel Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability 89 Geo. L. J. 797 (2001).
34 Kristin Lane, Jerry Kang, & Mahzarin R Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law 3 Ann. Rev. 
Law and Soc. Sci. 427 (2007); Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law in William Peter Robinson (ed.), Social Groups and Identi-
ties: Developing the Legacy of Henri Taifel (Butterworth-Heinemann 1996).
35 Claire A Hill & Brett McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias 32 J. Corp. L. 833 
(2007).
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ability to improve on the decision-making of individuals by exposing and mitigating 
bias and mistake. But these benefits can vanish, and indeed transform into costs, if 
the group reinforces bias and submerges mistakes, worsening irrationalities. As 
Avishalom Tor has recently written, ‘the evidence shows small-groups outperform 
individual rationality in some cases but at other times exhibit similar or even more 
extreme judgmental biases and decision errors.’36
‘Groupthink’ is the most common example of this phenomenon, and is particularly 
relevant for corporate governance. ‘Groupthink’ is the label attached to mistakes made 
by institutional decision-makers when the presence of similarly thinking participants 
in a group results in biases being reinforced rather than challenged, and mistakes 
validated rather than exposed.37 Another example of group tendencies that worsen 
decision-making is the inclination for discussion within groups comprised of indi-
viduals with similar worldviews and perspectives to harden those perspectives and 
views. In discussions about political issues, for example, groups on the extremes of 
political discourse become more extreme after discussion within the group.38 These 
implications are greater within groups that are homogeneous in perspective and in 
racial, gender, and class composition, since ‘defective’ decision making is ‘strongly 
correlated’ with structural flaws such as ‘insulation and homogeneity.’39 As Jolls and 
Sunstein have articulated, ‘erroneous judgments often result when deliberations are 
undertaken by like-minded people.’40
The worry from a corporate governance perspective is that the quality of the 
decision-making of the board is eroded when its homogeneity and insularity make it 
less likely that ideas will be properly vetted or assumptions appropriately challenged.41 
If a key element of the success of the corporation as a business form is the presence 
of a sophisticated group decision-maker at the top of the business structure, this suc-
cess is put at risk when the board suffers from structural or formational defects that 
weaken the decisional process or skews the results.
Like the worry about bias and disloyalty, this concern about the insularity and 
homogeneity of the board is not mitigated by the traditional corporate law insistence 
on board member independence. The mere fact that a board member is not employed 
by the company does not correlate well with the needed diversity of perspective. 
Instead, attention needs to turn to the actual makeup of the board, with the goal of 
36 Avishalom Tor,  The Market, The Firm, and Behavioral Antitrust in The Oxford Handbook of 
Behavioral Economics and the Law, 63 (Notre Dame Legal Studies 2013).
37 Kath Hall, Looking beneath the Surface: The Impact of Psychology on Corporate Decision 
Making 49 Managerial Law 3, 93 (2007); Irving Lester Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of 
Political Decisions And Fiascoes (Houghton Mifflin 1983); Marleen O’Connor, The Enron Board: The 
Perils of Groupthink 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1233 (2003).
38 Daniel Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis 50 J. Personality and 
Soc. Psychol. 1141 (1986); Cass R Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and 
Information Markets 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (2005); Tor, supra n 36, 63.
39 Cass R Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Harvard University Press 2003).
40 Christine Jolls & Cass R Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law 35 J. Legal Stud. 199, 218 (2006).
41 Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law, supra n 24.
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using greater board pluralism as a tool to create a board culture that encourages dis-
sent and challenge.
If the homogeneity of groups is a reason to worry about the quality of its decisions, 
then the current makeup of most boards is quite flawed. In fact, corporate boards may 
be the least diverse powerful institutions in the United States. Scholars increasingly 
point out the gender and racial homogeneity of boards and executive suites, and the 
dangers to decision-making posed by such narrowness.42
Indeed, the value of more diverse boards is an area where behavioral research is 
likely to be quite helpful going forward. If diversity does indeed assist in debiasing 
boards, then more diverse boards should experience improvements in their decision-
making. While the question of how to measure such improvements is tricky, behav-
ioral research is beginning to amass a fairly convincing set of studies that bolster the 
hypothesis that diversity improves board (as opposed to company) performance. For 
example, boards with more women have been shown to be more active and indepen-
dent in monitoring management, to be more likely to engage with the company’s 
stakeholders, to show more attention to risk oversight and control, and to be more 
likely to be concerned about social responsibility.43 There is also evidence that the 
presence of women on a board improves the quality of board deliberations, in part by 
empowering ‘constructive dissent’ that can lead to ‘board unity,’ which is ‘essential 
to setting a clear strategic direction and to overseeing risk and resources.’44,45 One 
notable finding is that male directors attend more board meetings when the board is 
more gender diverse.46 Other recent findings indicate that more diverse business 
teams are able to take advantage of a wider pool of relevant kno wledge.47 In the words 
42 Lisa M Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story? 89 N.C. L. Rev. 855 
(2011); Douglas M Branson, The Last Male Bastion: Gen der and the CEO Suite at Public Companies 
(NYU Press 2010); Lissa L Broome & Kimberly D Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is 
Anyone Listening? 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 341 (2008); Douglas M Branson, No Seat at the Table: How Co r-
porate Governance and Law Keep Women Out of the Boardroom (NYU Press 2007); Devon W Carbado 
& G Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities do When they get There 
61 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1643 (2004).
43 David AH Brown, De bra L Brown & Vanessa Anastosopoulos, Women on Boards: Not Just the 
Right Thing… But the “Bright” Thing (Conference Board of Canada 2002).
44 Ronald J Burke & Susan Vinnicombe, Women on Corporate Boards of Directions: International 
Research and Practice in Susan Vinnicombe et. al. (eds), Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: 
International Issues and Opportunities (Edward Elgar 2008); Quinetta M Robertson & Hyeon Jeong 
Park, Examining the Link Between Diversity and Firm Performance: The Effects of Diversity Reputation 
and Leader Racial Diversity 32 Group and Org. Mgmt. 548 (2007); Morton Huse & Anne Grethe Sol-
berg, Gender-Related Boardro om Dynamics: How Scandinavian Women Make and Can Make Contribu-
tions on Corporate Boards 21(2) Women in Mgmt. Rev. 113 (2006); Nicholas Van der Walt & Coral 
Ingley, Board Dynamics and th e Influence of Professional Background, Gender, and Ethnic Diversity 
of Directors 15 Corp. Governance 291 (2003).
45 Brown, Brown, & Anastosopoulos, Women on Boards, supra n 43, 5.
46 Renee B Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and their Impact on Governance 
and Performance 94 J. Fin. Econ. 291 (2009).
47 Sander Hoogendoorn & Mirjam van Praag, Ethnic Performance and Team Performance: A Field 
Experiment, Discussion Paper 6731 (Inst. for the Study of Labor 2012).
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of Aaron Dhir, ‘establishing a level of “cognitive diversity” in the boardroom is … a 
key strategic asset which serves to assist the firm in averting the perils and docile 
conduct associated with groupthink.’48
Two caveats to this body of research need articulation. The first is that any benefits 
to diversity will have to be measured against the possible costs of diversity, including 
a less streamlined decision-making process and less intragroup trust, at least initially.49 
From the standpoint of institutional design (as opposed to justice, for example) the 
goal is to have boards with ‘enough diversity to encourage the sharing of information 
and active consideration of alternatives, but enough collegiality to sustain mutual 
commitment and make consensus-reaching practicable.’50
The other caveat has to do with the link between board performance and company 
financial performance. Assuming board management matters, we should expect to 
see improvements in board decision-making manifested in improvement in company 
financial performance. To date, however, the evidence as to whether diversity of 
boards leads to measurable improvements in company financial performance is 
largely equivocal.51 Dhir, for example, reports that while some studies find a correla-
tion between board diversity and profitability, the causal link is unclear and its direc-
tion uncertain.52 And even when a causal link is indicated, the data suggest that some 
board functions benefit from diversity while others do not.53
Of course these equivocal data do not disprove the arguments in favor of board 
diversity. The data might be unclear because the correct ‘mix’ of diversity has yet to 
be calibrated, or it could suggest that the benefits of diversity to board performance 
accrue in ways that do not appear in the financial data in the short term. It is also 
important to note that evaluating the benefits of diversity only in terms of financial 
data ignores diversity’s nonfinancial benefits and undervalues its other rationales.54
All in all, the research remains undeveloped enough that it is yet unknown how 
best to create the conditions whereby the benefits of diversity are maximized and the 
costs minimized. It seems clear enough that sufficient numbers are necessary to over-
come the problems of tokenism and self-censorship. Efforts to clarify how best to 
cure the problems of homogeneity are almost certainly to b e worth the scholarly and 
regulatory attention.
48 Aaron A Dhir, Towards  a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception of the Firm: Canadian Cor-
porate Governance, Law and Diversity 35 Queen’s L. J. 569, 595 (2010).
49 Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards, supra n 33.
50 Ibid., 810–1.
51 David Carter, Frank P D’Souza, Betty J Simkins & W Gary Simpson, The Gender and Ethnic 
Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance 18(5) Corp. Gover-
nance: An Int’l Rev. (2010); Dhir, supra n 48; Branson, No Seat at the Table, supra n 42; Kathleen 
A Farrell & Philip L Hersch, Additions to Corporate Boards: The Effect of Gender 11 J. Corp. Fin. 
85 (2005).
52 Dhir, supra n 48. 
53 Ibid.
54 Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited, supra n 42; Thomas W Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Share-
holder Value 54 J. Legal Ed. 351 (2004).
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Moreover, it is also worth considering that gender and racial diversities are hardly 
the only kinds of pluralism likely to be effectual in debiasing board decisions and 
protecting against groupthink. In fact, class differences may trump racial and gender 
differences as proxies for distinctiveness of perspective.55 As I argued above, broad-
ening the board (even by way of mandatory rule) to include directors elected by 
employees and other stakeholders would improve board deliberation.56 There are 
firm-level and country-level data that can be cited in support of ‘co-determined’ 
boards, if not for stakeholder boards.57 Some business leaders, for example, have 
suggested that the resilience of Germany in the face of the global financial crisis is 
owing, at least in part, to German companies’ inclusion of employee representatives 
on supervisory boards.58 But behavioral research is quite thin in this area, with 
insights coming from extrapolating from behavioral resear ch regarding political dif-
ferences among members of groups, the creation of in-group identity, and the salience 
of the tendency for reciprocity.59
As behavioral scholarship on diversity grows in influence and scope, it is worth 
emphasizing that traditional corporate law jurisprudence is unlikely to be sufficiently 
nimble or accommodating to do much about its insights. The board’s own makeup 
falls squarely within the sphere of business judgment toward which US courts gener-
ally genuflect. As of 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission does require US 
companies to disclose ‘whether, and if so how, the nominati ng committee…considers 
diversity in identifying nominees for director,’ but there is no teeth in the provision 
and the kinds of diversity at issue are few.60 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 incen-
tivized greater board member independence, especially on auditing committees, 
which some have argued will help with the debiasing project.61 But as mentioned 
above, behavioral research suggests that the independence called for is not the kind 
that will lead to real diversity of perspectives.62
For our purposes, however, these behavioral studies indicate that diversity on 
boards will likely improve the quality of their decision making, especially in guarding 
against the perils of ‘groupthink.’ As this research grows in scope and persuasiveness, 
so will the arguments in favor of stakeholder boards.
55 Lisa M Fairfax, The Bott om Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business 
Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 795 (2005).
56 Kent Greenfield, The Stakeholder Strategy 26 Democracy: A Journal of Ideas 47 (2012); Green-
field, Defending Stakeholder Governance, supra n 11; Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate 
Law, supra n 24; Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law, supra n 13.
57 Conchon, supra n 16.
58 Ibid.
59 Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law, supra n 13.
60 Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited, supra n 42.
61 Jolls & Sunstein, supra n 40.
62 Oliver Marnet, Behavior and Rationality in Corporate Governance 1 Int’l J. Behav. Acct. and 
Fin. 4 (2008).
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III. Competing Interests
1. The Debate
In most discussions of the age-old question of whether stakeholder interests are served 
by the shareholder primacy norm, the analysis from the shareholder primacists is 
fairly rudimentary and follows a straightforward logical syllogism. In the long run, 
they say, all stakeholders benefit from the survival of the firm. And because there is 
unity between the interests of the firm as a whole with those of shareholders as resid-
ual claimants, as long as managers act with care and loyalty toward shareholders they 
will satisfy the interests of other stakeholders as well.
One hears this argument in various guises, and it is ultimately unpersuasive.63 It is 
true that stakeholders tend to benefit from the firm’s survival over time; a company 
that is losing money is not much good to anyone with any kind of investment in the 
firm. (There are exceptions to even this assertion. Consider, for example, whether the 
environment and those who depend on it benefit from the eternal survival of Exxon 
Mobil.) But when we look past the narrow circumstance of when a firm is failing, the 
claim that stakeholder and shareholder interests coalesce becomes tenuous. A com-
pany that makes money for shareholders does not necessarily create wealth for others 
or for society. Without a mechanism within the corporation to force it to absorb exter-
nalities or to share profits with all stakeholders, there is no necessary gain on the part 
of employees, for example, even when the firm is making a great deal of money. The 
‘trickle down’ is not inevitable. Shareholder gain could come, in fact, as a result of a 
transfer of wealth from labor or from society.
Moreover, shareholders will prefer managers to engage in decisions that may be 
overly risky from the perspective of other stakeholders and of society as a whole. 
Because of limited liability, shareholders are protected from bearing the full downside 
costs of risky decisions, whereas on a societal basis all costs have to be accounted 
for. As I have said elsewhere, ‘[t]here is no such thing as a “limited liability society” 
in which society contributes to the corporation in very meaningful ways (providing 
workers, real property) without fear of bearing the negative impact of its operation.’64
Another reason why I find unpersuasive the argument that the long-term interests 
of stakeholder and shareholder coalesce is that, following Keynes, ‘in the long run 
we are all dead.’65 In other words, even if the shareholder primacists were correct that 
such coalescence occurs, the time horizon assumed is many years in the future. This 
weakens the argument in two ways. First, shareholders who care only about the finan-
cial aspect of their share ownership (which, we are told to assume, are all of them) 
63 I explained why I do not find this argument persuasive elsewhere. For a sampling, see Greenfield, 
The Failure of Corporate Law, supra n 13, 137.
64 For an argument that employee interests are a better proxy for the interests of the firm, and for 
society as a whole, see ibid., 41–71.
65 ‘But this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead.’ John 
Maynard Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform 80 (MacMillan 1924).
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will have any long-term gains or losses swamped by short-term losses or gains. This 
is a financial truism – assuming a reasonable discount rate, the long-term financial 
implications of decisions trend toward zero as the time horizon moves further out. 
For example, at a seven percent discount rate – the rate assumed by the US govern-
ment for some projects, based on a typical rate of return for private investments66 
– a $100 benefit in one hundred years is worth only twelve cents today. So any ratio-
nal shareholder would prefer a thirteen-cent gain today rather than a $100 gain in a 
hundred years, even if all the gain inured to them rather than others.67 A more trou-
bling example, assuming the same discount rate: even if shareholders were convinced 
that climate change will be a major crisis in the long-term, causing a $100 trillion 
dollars in damage 500 years from now (and assuming they were not able to external-
ize any of the costs to others), what would they rationally spend now to avoid it? 
Twenty cents.68 So shareholders will not likely push for decisions that benefit the firm 
as a whole – much less other stakeholders – if the payoff is likely to be far in the 
future.69
Second, the potential payoffs to stakeholders of shareholder primacy are too far in 
the future to be worthy of deference. In a sense, this is the same point about the dis-
count rate made above with regard to shareholders, only more concrete. At heart, the 
argument for shareholder primacy is an argument that attention to shareholder inter-
ests will naturally, as by an invisible hand, benefit other stakeholders. A necessary 
corollary to this claim is that corporate managers should be prohibited from taking 
into account the interests of other stakeholders. But note the audacity of the claim 
–  the best way to benefit other stakeholders is for their benefit never to enter the 
managerial decision making calculus. Not even Adam Smith, who created the notion 
of the invisible hand, ever suggested that those in charge of capital should be prohib-
ited from taking into account the implications of its use on those who do not own it.
So the claim about the long-term interests of other stakeholders reduces to the 
notion that the bare survival of firms is the best way to benefit all stakeholders. This 
can only be true, if at all, in the longest of long terms, and only if a host of other con-
ditions are met. One example will suffice to illustrate the tenuous nature of the claim. 
Imagine a company facing the choice of whether to close a unionized, high-wage 
factory and moving production to a sweatshop in a country that has no health and 
safety protections for workers. Shareholders will certainly prefer the change, holding 
all else equal. The decrease in labor costs will flow to the corporation’s bottom line, 
available for distribution to shareholders. Revenue flowing to labor shifts from one 
locale to another, and decreases in the aggregate.70 How is labor, or society as a whole, 
66 See OMB Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal 
Programs, http://www.whitehouse.give/omb/circulars_a094, 9 (29 October 1992).
67 For an excellent and accessible explanation of this point, see Frank Partnoy, WAIT: The Art and 
Science of Delay 236–40 (PublicAffairs 2012).
68 Ibid., 239.
69 For an explanation of why long-term costs are not internalized in short-term security prices, see 
Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 627 (2011).
70 For simplicity, I am ignoring the possible difference in the marginal utility of income between 
the higher income (former) employees and the lower income (new) employees, as well as the possible 
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benefited? Only if the benefit to the shareholders, or to the firm, outweighs the net 
costs suffered by the employees, and those benefits flow from the shareholders to 
others. To believe it would, one has to rely on trickle-down economics or trust the 
redistributional efforts of government. The former is dubious; the latter is contentious 
and unreliable.
2. Representing Competing Interests
A more sophisticated way to think about the relationship among various stakeholders 
would recognize that some policies, norms, and laws work to the benefit of a subset 
of stakeholders, some are consistent with the interests of only one stakeholder, and a 
few are valuable to all. At its simplest, one could represent such a tradeoff between 
two stakeholders with a simple two-by-two quadrant. For example, the potential rela-
tionships between shareholder and employee interests could be represented as in 
Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Some policies would likely be in the interests of both, and would fit in the northeast 
quadrant. Limits on executive compensation, for example, would best go there. Some 
would benefit neither, and would fit in the southwest quadrant. An example of this 
would be judicial deference to ‘selfish’ charitable spending by management.71 Some 
difference in the marginal utility of the gain enjoyed by the shareholders and the marginal disutility of 
the loss suffered by labor.
71 See, for example, Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) 54–5 (upholding a corporate expen-
diture to fund an art museum as homage to the company’s CEO).
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policies benefit one stakeholder at the expense of the other. A high minimum wage, 
for example, most likely benefits employees and costs shareholders, putting it in the 
northwest quadrant. An enforceable profit-maximization norm benefits shareholders 
and most likely hurts employees, putting it in the southeast quadrant. (A more nuanced 
analysis would place policies and norms as a point in relation to each axis. It is pos-
sible, for example, for a policy to be very beneficial to employees, and thus high on 
the north/south y-axis, but neutral on the east/west x-axis.)
One might dicker about which policy or norm fits in which quadrant, and it is pos-
sible that variations in time horizon influences which quadrant a policy belongs in. 
But this figure helps concretize the argument. For example, when shareholder prima-
cists argue that shareholder and stakeholder interests coalesce, they are in effect argu-
ing that all policies and rules trend over time toward a line stretching from the 
southwest corner to the northeast corner.
Of course such a two-dimensional figure does not capture much. Many of the most 
troubling dilemmas in corporate governance are not between shareholders and 
employees, but between managers and other stakeholders. How can managerial dis-
cretion be limited while still giving them true responsibility to manage the firm? 
Indeed, much tension in the policy and law governing corporations can be described 
as the interplay among shareholders, managers, and employees. To represent such 
tension, one option is a Venn diagram. See Figure 2.
Figure 2.
The intuition is straightforward. Some policies benefit one group over the other 
two; some benefit two out of the three, a few all three.
The best way to represent the interplay among these three groups, however, is to 
add a third (z) axis to our previous figure. Again, the intuition is straightforward. 
Policies have a different range of benefits and costs or limitations for the three groups. 
Any given policy, rule, or norm can be represented on a 3-axis figure according to 
those benefits and costs. See Figure 3.
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Figure 3.
Playing with this concept, allow me to suggest where some possible policies and 
rules would properly be located on this figure. A policy that would be protective of 
shareholder interests and managerial prerogative, but inconsistent with employee 
interests would fit as noted on Figure 3, near the northwest corner of the left wall. An 
example of such a policy would be executive compensation policies, such as options 
tied to share price, which align the interests of management with those of sharehold-
ers. Such policies reduce the possible disparity of interests between managers and 
shareholders, but most likely increases the disparity of interests between those two 
parties on the one hand and employees (and other stakeholders for that matter) on the 
other.
A policy that protected employee interests and managerial prerogative, at the 
expense of shareholders, would lie at the northeast corner of the right-hand wall of 
the figure. See Figure 4. An example of such a policy would be a rule of judicial def-
erence to management, such as the business judgment rule in the United States, when 
used by management to increase wages or benefits to employees. Another example 
would be deference to a managerial decision to use corporate funds for pro-employee 
charities.
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Figure 4.
A policy that limited managerial discretion to the benefit of both employees and 
shareholders would lie at the southern corner of the floor of the figure. See Figure 5. 
An example of such a policy would be a strong, enforceable duty of loyalty that would 
make it difficult for managers to engage in self-dealing.
MAKING THE MOST OF THE “STAKEHOLDER MOMENT” [2015] EBLR 167
Figure 5.
Policies that benefit one party at the expense of the other two would lie at the point 
of each axis. A policy protecting managers at the others’ expense – for example a 
business judgment rule so strong as to protect managerial carelessness or selfishness 
would lie at the top of the figure at the high point of the ‘managerial interest’ axis. 
See Figure 6. A policy protecting employees alone – strong protection for trade 
unions, for example – would lie at the end of the ‘employee benefit’ axis. See Figure 
7. A shareholder policy that comes at the expense of the other two parties, such as an 
enforceable profit maximization norm, would lie at the end of the ‘shareholder ben-
efit’ axis. See Figure 8.
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Figure 6.
Mapping the possible interaction among these three parties along three axes essen-
tially creates a two-by-two-by-two matrix of possibilities. For simplicity, they are 
best represented here by a pair of two-by-two quadrants, one which holds constant 
managerial constraint, and the other holding constant managerial prerogative. See 
Chart 1. These two quadrants can be imagined sitting on top of each other, with 
managerial interests running along a vertical z-axis.
Then any policy, rule, law, or norm affecting corporate governance can be placed 
in one of the eight boxes created by the matrix. (I have included some illustrative 
policies in each box.) Policies consistent with the interests of all three – a strong busi-
ness judgment rule when used by management to manage for the long-term benefit 
of all stakeholders, example – would be diagonal from a box containing policies 
inconsistent with all three – for example a rule protecting a stakeholder not among 
the three at the expense of the company.
Again, one can reasonably disagree as to the location in this matrix of any given 
policy or rule. In any event, my hope is that these figures aid in furthering a more 
sophisticated analysis of the interplay among the interests of the various parties. Such 
interplay is not always bipolar; rather, there are more possibilities for how they inter-
act.
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Figure 7.
IV. Conclusion
Much work lies ahead of those predicting, and advocating for, the downfall of share-
holder primacy. Stakeholder scholars should coalesce around a coherent alternative 
theory, should offer cogent reasons for switching, and offer tools to analyze whether 
such a switch is necessary. In this paper I have sketched the beginnings of a contribu-
tion in each area of scholarly need. This is only a beginning, to be sure. But the win-
dow of opportunity for challenging the deeply embedded assumptions of conventional 
theories of corporate governance will not stay ajar forever. Stakeholder theorists 
should take advantage of such an opportunity now, before the window closes.
KENT GREENFIELD170
Figure 8.
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Chart 1.
